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C h i t i l  the l a t e  nineteenth century the ;Dor";gut?se presence i l l  I~Ioae~il.~ique 
7 ,- - uustnined by the muzunt~ comniuni-ty - men and wonen 1j.likerl t o  i'ortz~z.1 by t L c s  
- P  ..-* 
.,.. I;~2,,.l.th sad s t a t u s  but freyuently. very A f r i c a  i n  tllr+ir 1~~33.~ of .Life, +:'r.eir 
nocicc of tj-:.ougl~t and t h e i r  ~:c>cial structure.  As a r e s u l t  of the Zaabesi :ia.rs and 
the otresses axd stra. inr oL the l l s c r ~ ~ b l e * V o r  Af ica, the P o r t ' ~ ; , p e ~ e  ~ ~ , z d e  a. 
detemined effo-t t o  cm.sh "he nower of t h i s  c lass  mci di.er-ipate i t s  : ~ r e r : t i ~ ~ e ,  
3ad i:lilat t h e  night of imperial Portugz.1 f a i l e d  t o  com2lc.tc t!.:c slz~r;-j l ichotonics 
ci the nctiona1iz:t struggle have f i n a l l y  brought about - the mulatto:: a-..;? E<;:*: 
zt?anded on the f ron t ie rz  o f  society,  a forgotten minority, t h e i r  nediatin<: ~ o L e  
no longer relev,mt, saved from oblivion only by rornant5c i3razilian soc ia l  
h is tor ians .  
The term m l a t t o ,  however, r:ith i ts  ra the r  precise suggestions of 
3iscegenation, i s  misleading ifhen apylied t o  the e l i t e  of P o r t u ~ e s e  Zanbesia,,. 
i'hic e l i t e ,  ;tlreadg powerful i n  the 1570s and s t i l l  dominr~tinf; p o l i t i c r  three  
nmdred p a r s  l a t e r ,  lvas made U;, variously ol" bEuropean o r  Indian born mcx-chr~its, 
deserters,  convicts o r  o f f i c i a l s ,  of Chinese, Indo-Chinese o r  coczstn.1 TLuslims, 
of the of f-spring of these groups marrying anon;i; themselves o r  -.arr;linr. 1 1 i  t h  
Africans, ,and of ncn and rvlonen of wholly African p n r e n t a e .  Anionic i.Xrada,':; 
account of the r a c i a l  com2osition of leading members of the Portuguese comn~i i ig  
i n  the 1760s shows t h a t ,  of heads of families,  20 were Portuguese, 11 Indian, 7 
nulat to ,  and 1 Chinese, and tha t  of t h e i r  marriages 13 were of Portuguese t o  
mulatto, 5 Portuguese t o  Indian, 1 Portuguese t o  Chinese, 6 Indian t o  mulatto 
and 1 each of Indian t o  Indian, Chinese t o  Chinese, mulatto t o  Indian and 
rriulatto t o  mulatto. 
The predominanc5 of white Portuguese males i n  t h i s  anal.ysi:: did nc~t  
contincc .;.n the nineteenth century, when the Indian element became vcry much 
~3re Lx!~:srtant. Only J O ~ O  Bonifacio Alves da Si lva  of a l l  the  le2din:; ~uzuntr:'os 
cf Yt:e :'?~iber;i Wars i s  known t o  have a European ancestry. The r u l i n g  e l i t n ,  
hoi~evcr, a,lso included men of pure African parentagc !lad, f o r  one reason o r  
another, deserted o r  been u p o o t e d  from t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  soc ie t i e s .  These merl 
took service with a Portuguese eenhor as soldiers, traders, sl.~illed artisans, or 
simply as house-slaves. They were often referred tc: by the Portuguese as slzves 
and certainly many of them were captured in wars, bought and sold in slave 
markets, or enslaved in punishment for crimes. This, however, does not 
adequately describe the clientship bond which ,qve the slave comparative secllrity 
and protection as well as the opportunity to enrich himself, to acquire 
reputation and status, to buy slaves of his own and to establish himself as a 
kraal head or, more formidably still, as a chief or war-lord. 
On these slave bands depended the power and position not only of the 
Portuguese senhora but also of the whole Portuguese go.irernment, for there was no 
other military force of any significance in Zambesia. There is ample evidence of 
the power of these fighting bands of slaves at the end of the sixteenth century 
and soaething of their osganization can be seen in seventeenth century documents. 
In the eighteenth century, however, they appear as a fully organized group 
capable of taking independent action, and axe referred to by the name of 
chicunda - a name which later came to describe a distinctive cultural group. 
During the eighteenth century this independence was only sporadically 
displayed, for the connection with the shadowy government of Portugal was too 
important for the Zambesi muzungos or their slaves to \-rant to break away 
entirely. From Portuguese governors came land titles, land grants, official 
rdcs and government offices, all of which conferred status and economic power; 
from Portuguese priests cane the baptismal passport to Portuguese society; from 
Portuguese ships came firearms and trade goods. Far men who had broken with or 
been torn from their own communities, the hieraxchies of Portuguese society and 
Portuguese service were the only available alternative system. 
On the other hand, there were many powerful forces pulling the 
muzunaos and their chicunda followers towards Africa. Few of the European or 
Asian imigrants brought wives with them and, even when they did, few were 
content to live continently with one wife. Generation by generation the visages 
of the nost powerful famflies g r e w  darker and their education and modes of 
thougnt ever more influenced by the African women of their households. Another 
powerful Africanizing influence \,as the position of the great prazo senhors 
towards the free peasantry on their prazos. The African population retained 
their traditional chiefs and traditional social structure, but inevitably the 
powerful ~ r a z o  senhor appeared an the repository of ultimate authority. The 
evidence for the precise nature of this relationship is varied, but it bears out 
that the most successful muzungu senhors were those who played the role of 
chief - who levied tribute, saw to the appointment of headmen, perfornerl certain 
ritual functions, and maintained ultimate judicial authority. 
The Growth of the M u z w  States 
Early in the ~neteenth century the rela 5 lonship o f  the muzunw cl.~,ns 
to emh other end to the mvernment began to alter. Years of famine, the rise 
of the slave trade snd the Bgo~lll midc led to many of the leseer muzungos 
leaving Zambesia, with the result that power became concentrated in the hands of 
a few powerflnl families. Then followed the gradual tightening o f  ti?e screws on 
the slave trade. Portugal, caught between the powerful press- o f  Great Britain 
and the inescapable fact that the whole existence of her East African territories 
was t ied up with the slave trade, hesitated and wavered but finally tu;ned 
agairrzt the slavers. This weakened perceptibly the interest whicli the m ~ ~ , ~ l , q s ,  
with their deep commitment tc the slave trade, W in the Portugwee comoction. 
 ina ally, there came the direct pressures f r m  Portuguese colonial rdozmers  mad 
other European powexa to whom the world of the mzunms appeared aa s o d  as 
object for t h e i r  c ivi l izing attentions 88 any ~ t h e r ~ t r a d i t i o n a l  Afxican society. 
However, the m t o q  of the Zambesi Wars is nof sfmply the rstary aT W 
negative resistaace of atn old e~tabl i shed aamtmity to  the explicit  and &&?+tic 
threats of Imperh.lism and Bapitalism my more than is, far example, the R&MWa. 
'Phe nineteenth c 8 n t t q  w e ~ s  a period of e3q,wion f o r  t h ~  Por€u&w~e n w m m a  
such as they had not enjoyed etfnce the hemic dsye when Sisnando Dias Ba$M'W 
marchet3  hi^. slheb hvYm W e a  inb the lmwt of Bum (~ettebe.lehad), and with 
this - a i m  cane miflta~~ a d  hatibtimal frmwa.fliom of consi&rable 
interest. 
It is probable that in the slaving s ta tes  mch as those of Al Wlubejx 
and Tippu Tib one oan see the line of evolutionary ch- that Africa might  have 
f o ~ ~ & e & ' ~  m a n  piwk~t~on of ttie e tb t~~ t .  liz the etates 
W.9T19rre of' d m e l o ~  had @&er ,to unfoI& a& 
e r  nfahrity theOl in East kfric&a or the Sudan. 
. . . 1. 
. -. 
- ' Since +he la%e ei@teenth century #e % M e  of northem h b e e i a  had 
becob? ~ ~ ~ ~ l y  dmhated by %he Gsetmo Pemim~. !The family never held 
'W @zoa but built %heir pmmr salely on -&t&t3 atid: 4%e 'su&easM e~la;LCta%ion 
of cblefly r iva l r ies  amongst the m v e .  In 1840 the head of the family was 
Pedm Pereira (known ss ~houtama),a man with a formidable following of slave 
cl ients  sitd ath qaa &9a%dng intarizs%s thmxi@m& Bmbesia. He had been 
inves%ed with the cld&ai* D? Chic- %y W, the ptrhmmt chief of the 
w e s t e * ~ e ,  ahd kdlt &'stmng B ~ % B  .mwde *he wIki%  POP%@& .gm the . 
Parhgwso capital at Tete. This st&e ~ras  odl& Pltroel$gt; 
So effective were- Choutamats p o w ~  p o l i a c e  tht it ww said that more 
tzWa was dune i.p Fhanga t b  at Tete itseXf and ME( .mld.lers t~ere able t o  
da.; lce his W m a p l y  T= the SE=. 
b 
h e  Shi% mute t o  the interior was opened h the 1850s by Galdlrw ae 
Sousa, who secured control. of the ~~~t ?bunt k-hla. =B i n h e ~ ~ e  fell 
t o  Paul Plariamno V a s  dos Anjos, who built up the state  of 14aasingire independent 
of Portu$wse jurisdiction. On the lower Zambesi a aimliar state-building; 
pmces# hem ~ 5 t h  laaslrg b 1849 of T 3 k s s ~  to J o a q U  da C& &id af Wmhgaaa to lhnuel Antordo de trira 'in 1855. k i n g  the 1860s the 
s t a t e  of BIaganja &a Costa took ehape on the coast between the Quellmane 3~rerZ~ki 
and Bngoche, while above Tete embryo state systems appeared under Inacio de Jenus 
Xavier a t  Chicoa, under ~ m b a  in the ICariba region, and under IIatakenya on the 
Luang!a . 
Tllia s t a t e  bwll aess transcended the limits of the old prazos, 
tlnued t o  divide the newly occupied 
Cs t o  the F cMef8, in the  hope %1at 
ep other  ~ p e ~  at bay, 
weather military setbacks and fluctuating fortunes. 
In all these states the chiefly families were forced to share power 
and the chief was hedged about by the customary checks and restraints which 
feature in most African polities. Members of the chiefly family and the 
captains of the chicunda shared power with him, forming the council of pandes 
who advised, helped and sometimes dominated and dethroned the head of the family. 
Dethronings were, in fact, common and there are examples in the Vas dos Anjos, 
Pereira and da Cruz families. Also influential were the spirit mediums and 
keepers of the royal graves of the dead muzungo chiefs, and in Sousats vast 
territories the ninety or so wives of Manuel Antonio played an important role, 
being placed strategically through the country to try to check the power of the 
captains. 
The political and economic centre of the muzungo states was the great 
aringa. The aringas were larp and formidable defensive works built by making 
a palisade of green stakes which rooted to form a wall of living trees. They 
were frequently strengthened by stone-work and by bastions and were usually sited 
near banks of rivers. The arinms could be as much as a mile in circumference 
and might contain the huts of hundreds of the chief's followers. They were also 
the economic centre of the state where trade was conducted, booty shared out, 
sugar refined, and round which there might be extensive areas of cultivated land. 
Very often there were also outlying arinffas protecting the borfiers of 
the state, and commanded by trusted chicunda captains. These often bore the 
brunt of the fighting and, when Sousafs vast empire broke up in 1890, it was the 
local aringas which became new power nuclei. 
The aringa was the most successful military answer that any African 
people found to the military technology of the European armies. When an arinffa 
was defended with determination it could defy artillery and rifle fire and wear 
down the resources of the best equipped military force. There is only one case 
of an aringa being taken by military action - the final fall of Pkssangano in 
November 1888 - to set against the dozen or so military disasters suffered by 
the Portuguese in their attempts to storm them. 
Any hope that the arinms might develop into urban centres, however, 
wilted as the elites who had formed them were smashed and dispersed during the 
fighting. 
The Zambesi Wars 
The conflicts of the nineteenth century w$ch are honoured with the 
name of the Zambesi Wars were, then, very much the'p"roduct of local politics in 
a society which was changing and evolving as rapidly as the world outside was 
c hanging. 
The first phase of the wars falls between 1840 and 1862. During this 
period the Caetano Pereiras of Macanga contested first with the Tete authorities 
for control of the land of northern Zambesia and then with the da Cruz for 
control of the river itself. When Choutama died in 1849 Macanga had a virtual 
monopoly over all the trade routes to the northern interior. However, his son 
a d  successor, Chissaka, in alliance with the chiefs of independent Barue, was 
defeated in 1853 by the da Cruz outside the walls of Massangano. 
A similar duel took place lower down the Zambesi, where the Portuguese 
first tried to use the slaving interests of Vas dos Anjos and Cruz Coimbra to 
oust the da Cruz and then, under increasing pressure from Britain, broke the 
power of the Vas dos Anjos by capturing their stronghold at Shamo near the mouth 
of the Shire. 
Shortly after this the expansive forces of the muzungo traders and 
their chicunda made two significant advances. In 1861 Jo&o Bonifacio attacked 
and seized the sultanate of Angoche, and in the following year the fair at 
Zumbo was reopened by Albino Pacheco and a base was established for the invasicr. 
of Luangwa and Kafue territories. 
Pew, il" any, metropolitan Portuguese troops were involved in these 
cam?aips. The conflicts were between rival settler factions, one of which 
would be nominally fighting for the government and the other against, but both 
of whom would in reality be pursuing their own expansive ends. 
The second phase of the fighting, which lasted from 1867 to 1875, was a 
much more direct confrontation between the power of the da Cruz family and the 
government. The sensational and gruesome disasters suffered by one Portuguese 
army after another d.uring these years led the Lisbon government to commit more 
and more of its prestige and more and more of its European army to the crushing 
of the da Cruz. Each of the four expeditions, however, was also accompanied by 
contingents provided by the muzunm opponents of the da Cruz, and the campaigns 
which were so signal a disaster for Portuguese prestige were the making of the 
reputation of Manuel Antonio de Sousa and the means by which he built up his 
formidable fighting machine. 
The third phase of the \Jars, from 1880-1892, is the most complex, for 
Zambesia was under strong international pressures from greedy European powers 
and from Portuguese colonial reformers. At the same time, independent ilfricm 
states like Gaza, Barue and the Shona, Nacua and Wgoni chieftaincies were also 
tlireatened. The muzungos rrere increasingly faced with the choice of reaching an 
accomodetion with the Portuguese or attempting resistance. So evenly balanced 
appeared tine advantages that at different times all the muz-urns tried their 
fortune in collaboration with the Portuguese. The cleverest of them, like 
Sousa, Xavier and Kanyemba, a l w ~ s  knew how to pursue their aims under the 
Portuguese flag, but even the da Cruz, the Pereiras and the Vas dos Anjos tried 
to make terns with Portugal, while the chicunda captains of Maganja da Costa 
took service with the Portuguese as mercenaries as often as they led raids on 
Portu,weze territory. 
Inevitably, however, the rivalries of the muzunws among themselves 
threw some of them into opposition to Portugal, and these found allies mong 
the African chiefs who were trying to keep the Europeans at bay. 
The third phase opened with Manuel Antonio de Sousa seizing control of 
Barue in 1850 and then leading his asmy to put down the Nassingire rising of 
1884. Thereafter, in alliance with an imperial entrepreneur called Paiva de 
Andrada, Sousa laid plans for tile occupation of Mashonaland. In 1886 the chiefs 
of the lower Ibzoe were swamped and early in 1887 Sousa led his army onto the 
high veld to attack IvItoko. PLtoko sent messengers to the da C m ,  to Chidema and 
to the exiled Same aristocracy. This alliance of muzunffo and traditional chiefs 
was successful. Defeated, Sousa fell back on Barue and turned his attention to 
dealing with the da Cruz. As a result of family quarrels the da Cruz did not 
resist the attack when it came, and Andrada was able to take lfmssangano without 
a f ight  l a t e  i n  1887. The follo~rin,?; year, however, the da Cruz were back and 
the resistance was joined by the Yereiras of Ifiacanga. iTot un t i l  November 1888 
was the governor-general, Castilho, able to take and burn the da Cruz stronghold 
and put an  end to  the bloody history of t h i s  fortress.  
The revolt ,  ho~rever, continued, and with the ca7ture or" Souna -m& 
Andrada by the BSA police i n  T~,Z'tnica i n  1890 the vhole of Bzrue rose i n  rebellion 
as well, ?.ihile Sousals captains deserted t h e i r  naster ls  cause. Relea.sec! i n  
1891, Sousa t r i ed  to reconquer Barue with the help of Joao Coutinho but early 
i n  1892 he was k i l led  i n  bat t le .  
A t  the same time the Zumbo nuzunffos l o s t  the richest of t he i r  slave- 
hunting grounds when the Kafue and Luangwa valleys went to Britain i n  the 1891 
par t i t ion  treaty. 
During the third phase of the Zambesi Vars there had been a cer tain 
amount of unity of purpose md  sometimes of action as well - between the 
different ,yroups host i le  to  the Portuguese. There i s  evidence of considerable 
influence exerted by the spirit-mediums and there were "a;.a;.nzstic'l i i l e ~ i a @ s  
between the muzungo families a d  with t radi t ional  chiefly houses. The r e su l t  
had been to  i lull ify the po l i t i ca l  wiles of the Portuguese and to  gzin a military 
success against a r t i l l e r y ,  machine-guns, and ,gin-boats unique i n  the history of 
African resistance i n  southern AfrFca. 
IIowever, there were to  be no further successes. True, u i th  the f a l l  of 
Sousa,Goron~sa and his  other t e r r i t o r i e s  were taken over by the leading chicunda 
cantains and most of these adopted a very independent a t t i tude  totrards the 
Portuguese, but there was no focus of leadership. The same was t rue of Barue, 
where r iva l  branches of the royal house remained i n  confl ic t  and allowed the 
country to  be exploited by white adventurers. The &a Cruz never regained t h e i r  
former influence and Mtoko was now i n  Bri t ish terr i tory.  Although there was 
considerable resistance i n  idhoodesia to  the BSA Company, there was never any 
successful combination with the resistance groups i n  Portuguese terr i tory.  The 
fa i lure  of African resistance i n  t h i s  fourth and f ina l  stage i s  not easy to  
explain except i n  terns of lack of leadership and lack of a common objective. 
As a resu l t  the Portuguese were gradually able to  i so la te  and destroy 
the different elements of opposition. In 1897 Coutinho broke the power of 
Cambuenba, the most important of Sousals captains, and followed th i s  up with a 
successful campaign against 14ab..anja da Costa i n  1898. In 1902 it wa: the turn 
of Barue. During th i s  f i na l  w a r  some vestige of the old unity returned. The 
two royal houses agreed t o  combine a,qinst the Portuguese and they were Soined by 
Cambuemba and contingents from the da Cruz prazos. 3ut th i s  combination l a id  
them open to the single decisive defeat, and th i s  was swiftly inf l ic ted  on them 
by Coutinho. They were not joined by Luis Santiago, one of :ousag S captains bI:lo 
s t i l l  held Goronmsa, and thj-S nay well have been disastrous fo r  both p, ,rt ies,  
because with the defeat of 3a,rue a column was sent against Luis and he was 
ca,ptured and shot. 
Finally, i n  1902, a force of Wgoni raised on the front iers  of Kyaoaland 
attacked Iiacanm and crushed Chinsinga, the l a s t  Pereira chief. 1902 i s  usually 
taken to be the end of the Zambesi :.'ars, but it was not the end of resistance i n  
I~iozmbique. l o t  un t i l  1910 could Portugal occupy the hinterland of Angoche, and 
i n  1317 there was serious r i s ing  i n  a l l  the areas where f i ~ h t i n g  had been endemic 
during the previous century. 
The end of the fighting did not, however, see the end of muzunm 
power entirely. The big families had been broken but there vere many lesser 
families who had held onto much of their position on the pretext of aiding the 
Portuguese. After 1892 the prazos were all reauctioned on new terms and most of 
them fell to scratch commercial companies formed to exploit the masses of 
easily available land. Nest of these companies were undercapitalized and had 
no skilled personnel or administration. They tended to sublet their prazos to 
the more enterprising of the old muzunm families. The most striking examplaof 
this were the leasing of much of northern Zambesia to the Caetano Pereiras in 
1395 and the contracts mcde by the 1"Iozambique Company with Luis Santiago, 
Cambueiba ahd Eusebio Ferrao. 
. l (  _ ?I 
Under the new prazo la,w, the renters provided their own police and 
collected the taxes - it was the old regime in new guise. And the old regime of 
the slave trade revived as well, for the demand for labour in the surrounding 
Britizh colonies was so ,meat that the new prazo senhors happily recruited their 
peasantry and packed them off to South African mines or Rhodesian farms. 
The real decline of muzunm power in Zambesia cane after the First 
L'orld :ar when the concession conpmies began at last tg establish 
administrations of passing efficiency. 
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Chronology of the  Zanbesi TViars 
Choutama at tacks  ITar~ve chief Bive 
Choutana defeats Portuguese a t t ack  on IIacanga 
Portuguese force t o  C h o u t a  t o  sue f o r  peace 
Death or" Choutana 1~llo;:ed bjr r a ids  by Phcanga on Tete 7 s  
Joaquim da Cruz ren t s  ;Iassangano 
Galdino Paustino de Sousa opens slave route up Shire 
Defeat of I4acanm a ~ d  Bame a t  %ssan~.ano 
Death of Galdina de Souea 
Cruz Coimbra leads s e t t l e r  expedition against  da CFJZ 
Sic2rd leads f i r s t  ~ o v e m e n t  expedition agains t  da Cmz 
Death of Joaquim da Cmz. ib11el Antonio de Sous? bui lds  base ia G o r o n ~ s a  
- - i~unsa  L m t o  of Anz-d~e s t a r t s  r a ids  on Zambesia 
Livingstone' S f i r s t  passage down Zambesi 
Arrest of Paul :+Iarianno Vas dos Anjos I 
Death of Chissaka 
Portuguese defeat Vas dos b j o s  and take Shano 
Beginning of Livingstone's Zambesi -edition 
,7050 Bonifacio da Silva  conquer:: Angoche andis  k i l l e d  
Albino Pacheco r e f  ounds Zumbo 
Phnienzi of I*kcanga makes t r e a t y  with Portutuese 
h t o n i o  da Cruz makes t r e a t y  ~ r i t h  Portuguese 
Death of Paul Ih.rianno Sias dos Anjos I 
:Tanuel Antonio cie Uousa becomes capit'io-mor of Ymica 
End of LP~ingstone'  S Zanbesi Expedition 
pEguel Gouveia defeated and k i l l e d  at I4assa.n@no 
Oliveira Queiros expedition zpins t EIassangano f a i l s  
Portuga,l's Vasconcellos wiped out in front of Massangano 
Tavares de Almeida expedition against Massangmo routed 
Supposed homage of 1Ianica to Manuel Antonio de Sousa 
Kankuni of 1kcang.d sips treaty with the Portuguese 
Antonio da Cruz and Portuguese make peace 
Marriage of Manuel Antonio to daughter of Macombe of EWue 
Death of Antonio da Cruz 
Paul W i m o  Vas dos Anjos I1 makes agreement to aid Portuwese 
Death of Macombe. Sousa seizes power in Barue 
Paul Marianno Vas dos Anjos deposed and killed. Portuguese annex 
F'Ias singire 
Massingire rising 
Andrada's exploration of lower Mazoe 
Andrada and Sousa occupy lower Ikzioe 
Sousa defeated in Mtoko 
Chatara (da Cruz) deposed. Sousa and Andrada take Massangano 
I%canga rebels against Portugal 
Castilho's expedition to take Massangano 
~ordon/~erpa Pinto expeditions to central Africa 
Britain's ultimatum to Portugal 
Sousa and Andrada captured in M c a .  Rebellion in Barue 
Naganja ds Costa mercenaries in Barme under Coutinho defeated 
Anglo-Portuguese frontier agreement 
Maganja da Costa solcliers attack Quelimane prazos 
Defeat and death of lknuel Antonio de Sousa 
Chinsinga of Macanga rents prazos from Zambesia Company 
Defeat and flight of Cambuemba in Sena district 
Coutinho suppresses lhganja da Costa 
Defeat of Macanga and death of Chinsinga, 
Defeat of Luis Santiagn in Gorongosa 
Defeat of Barue/~ambuemba alliance 

